With greater availability of data and increasing interaction activities taking place on social media, to detect overlapping and hierarchical communities has become an important issue and one that is essential to social media analysis. In this paper, we propose a coalition formation game theory-based approach to identify overlapping and hierarchical communities. We model community detection as a coalition formation game in which individuals in a social network are modelled as rational players aiming to improve the group's utilities by cooperating with other players to form coalitions. Each player is allowed to join multiple coalitions, and those coalitions with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as the merge operation is beneficial to the utilities of the merged coalitions, thus overlapping and hierarchical communities can be revealed simultaneously. The utility function of each coalition is defined as the combination of a gain function and a cost function. The gain function measures the degree of interactions amongst the players inside a coalition, while the cost function instead represents the degree of the interactions between the players of the coalition and the rest of the network. As game theory provides a formal analytical framework with a set of mathematical tools to study the complex interactions among rational players, to apply game theory for detecting communities helps to identify communities more rationally. Some desirable properties of the utility function, such as the non-resolution limit and the non-scaling behaviour, have been examined theoretically. To solve the issue of pre-setting the number and size for communities and to improve the efficiency of the detection process, we have developed a greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities. Extensive experiments have been conducted on synthetic and real networks to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.
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Introduction
With social networks gaining in popularity, social network analysis has become an important research issue, with a significant impact on society (Fortunato 2010; Li et al. 2014) . One major and fundamental topic in social network analysis is community detection, i.e. to identify groups of vertices in a network such that the vertices within a group are much more connected to each other than to the rest of the network (Newman and Girvan 2004; Fortunato 2010) . Because individuals belonging to the same community are more likely to have common features, such as social functions, interests on some topics, viewpoints, etc. (Zhao et al. 2012) , the identified communities can be used in the improvement of services (Krishnamurthy and Wang 2000) , knowledge sharing , collaborative recommendation (Yuan et al. 2010 ), information spreading (Wu et al. 2004) , structure visualizing (Wu and Li 2011) , and other applications. In recent years, community detection has received a great deal of attention as it has significance relating to online influence analysis, online marketing and ebusiness (Bagrow 2012; Papadopoulous et al. 2012; Li et al. 2014b; Francesco and Clara 2014; Zhou and Lü 2014) .
However, community detection is not a straightforward task, because in real networks communities can be overlapped or hierarchical, and these features often occur simultaneously. The overlap of communities implies that vertices simultaneously belong to more than one group, for instance, people belong to different social groups, depending on their activities, interests, etc. (Palla et al. 2005) . This breaks the assumption that a community should have more internal than external connections (because highly overlapping communities can have many more external than internal connections), and demands a method that is able to detect either overlapping or non-overlapping communities ). The hierarchical form of communities implies that the communities are recursively grouped into a hierarchical structure, i.e. small communities can form larger ones, which in turn can group more communities together to form even larger ones, etc. In the presence of hierarchies, the concept of community structure becomes richer, and demands a method that is able to detect communities at different levels, not just within a single level ). Another two essential challenges in community detection are the efficiency of algorithms and the prior knowledge on the number and size of communities, because the presence of many vertices and links in a large network results in heavy computation, and the number and size of communities are usually unknown beforehand. At present, these issues have not been solved satisfactorily. In existing community detection algorithms, some require a priori knowledge on the number and size of communities before performing the task of detecting communities, some are not able to detect overlapping and hierarchical communities, and some are not applicable to large-scale networks due to the low efficiency.
Motivated by the need for developing an algorithm that can detect both overlapping and hierarchical communities without prior knowledge on the number and size of communities in large-scale networks, we develop an approach by applying cooperative game theory (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1994) to detect communities in this study. Cooperative game theory (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1994) studies the cooperative behaviours of groups of rational players, where players cooperate with each other for improving the group's utility, such a group of players is called a coalition. One class of cooperative games is coalition formation games (Saad et al. 2009 ), whose main objective is to analyse the formation of coalitional structures through players' interaction. Coalition formation games are generally not superadditive due to the presence of costs that reduce the gains from forming the coalition. In social network environments, the behaviours of individuals are not independent (Zacharias et al. 2008) , and joining a community provides one with tremendous benefits, such as members feeling rewarded in some ways for their participation in the community, and gaining honour and status for being members (Sarason 1974) . In which case, every individual has an incentive to join communities; however, in real-world cases not only does each individual receive benefit(s) from the communities it belongs to, but the individual must also pay a certain price to maintain its membership within these communities (Chen et al. 2010) . These characteristics make coalition formation game theory applicable to community detection.
In this study, we first model the process of community detection as a coalition formation game, in which individuals in a social network are modelled as rational players aiming to achieve the maximal group's utility by cooperating with other players to form coalitions. A coalition is a subset of players. Each player is allowed to join multiple coalitions, which reflects the concept of "overlapping communities".
Meanwhile, coalitions with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as such merge operations could improve the utilities of the coalitions. This process reveals, in fact, the hierarchical structure of communities. A coalition is regarded as a stable community if it cannot further improve its utility by merging with other coalitions. If no coalition can further improve its utility by merging with other coalitions, the game achieves an equilibrium state of coalitions, and the configuration of communities at this state is called the stable community structure.
Next, we introduce the utility function for each coalition, which is the combination of a gain function and a cost function. The gain function measures the degree of the interaction amongst the players inside a coalition, while the cost function represents the degree of the interaction between the players of that coalition and the rest of the network. Based on the defined utility function, two coalitions without any link between them cannot improve their utilities by merging into a larger coalition, thus whether a coalition is merged with others can be decided by looking only at its neighbours (coalitions that have at least one link between them), rather than necessitating the performance of an exhaustive search over the entire network. This can speed up the computation considerably.
Then, we develop a greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities, which starts from the vertices as separate coalitions (singletons); coalitions are iteratively merged to improve the group's utilities until no further merging of coalitions is needed. This greedy agglomerative manner does not require a priori knowledge on the number and size of the communities, and it matches the real-world scenario, in which communities are formed gradually from bottom to top.
Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on different networks to assess the performance of our approach. Meanwhile, we also compare our results with other related studies. The experimental results show that our algorithm is effective and efficient in identifying overlapping and hierarchical communities.
The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows:
 The coalition formation game theory is applied to address the community detection problem. This approach considers community formation as the result of the group behaviours of rational players who cooperate with each other to form coalitions for achieving and improving a group's utilities.
 A utility function for modelling the benefit and cost of each coalition is introduced, and the properties of the utility function, such as the non-resolution limit and the non-scaling behaviour, have been examined theoretically.
 An algorithm based on the greedy agglomerative manner is proposed to identify communities. The proposed algorithm does not require a priori knowledge on the number and size of communities, and it can detect the overlapping and hierarchical communities simultaneously.
 Extensive experiments on synthetic and real networks have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces related work; Section 3 presents a coalition formation game theory-based framework for community detection; Section 4 provides a community detection algorithm that uses the greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities. The experimental results on the synthetic and real networks are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes this paper.
Related work
A well-known method for detecting non-overlapping and non-hierarchical communities is the use of modularity-based methods (Newman and Girvan 2004) , which is based on the idea that a random graph is not expected to have a cluster structure, so the possible existence of clusters is revealed by the comparison between the actual density of edges in a subgraph and the density one would expect to have in the subgraph, if the vertices of the graph were attached regardless of community structure (Fortunato 2010) . However, modularity-based methods implicitly assume that communities do not intersect with one another, which is usually not the case for real-world communities (Chen et al. 2010) . Fortunato and Barthélemy (2006) found that modularity optimization may fail to identify communities smaller than a scale which depends on the total number of links of the network and on the degree of interconnectedness of the communities, even in cases where communities are unambiguously defined. Brandes et al. (2008) also identified counterintuitive properties of modularity, such as non-locality and sensitivity to satellites.
To detect overlapping communities, Palla et al. (2005) defined a k-clique-community as the union of all k-cliques that can be reached from each other through a series of adjacent k-cliques. But their algorithm requires the size of clique as an input, which is usually unknown in practical applications. Ahn et al. (2010) considered a community to be a set of closely interrelated links instead of a set of vertices with many links between them. Comparing with vertex communities, link communities incorporate overlap while revealing hierarchical organizations. In general, the number of links is greater than the number of vertices, so link-based approaches may suffer from greater computation cost than a vertex-based approach in the process of detecting communities. Ball et al. (2011) proposed a probabilistic model of link communities to detect communities, either overlapping or not, and used a fast, closed-form expectation-maximization algorithm to analyse networks of millions of vertices in reasonable running times. However, the approach of Ball et al. offers no criterion for determining the number of communities in a network. Galbrun et al. (2014) adapted efficient approximation algorithms to find k communities of labelled graphs so that the total edge density over all k communities is maximized and each community is succinctly described by a set of labels. To detect overlapping communities in semantic social networks, Xin et al. (2015a; proposed methods, in which it is not necessary to pre-set the number of communities; Wu et al. (2015) provided an algorithm to solve the query biased densest connected subgraph (QDC) problem, where overlapping local communities and multiple disjointed local communities can also be found.
Hierarchical clustering algorithms are usually used to reveal hierarchical communities of graphs. Sales-Pardo et al. (2007) proposed a top-down approach to identify the hierarchical communities of a graph from the similarity matrix of vertices, but the algorithm is not fast enough (Fortunato 2010) . Clauset et al. (2008) used a dendrogram and a set of probabilities associated to the internal vertices of the dendrogram to describe the hierarchical organization of a graph. This method is capable of describing closely the graph properties, but it is impossible to rank community structures according to their relevance. Shen et al. (2009) handled the set of maximal cliques and adopted an agglomerative framework to detect both the overlapping and hierarchical properties of a complex community structure, but the efficiency of their algorithm requires improvement. Blondel et al. (2008) proposed a rapid method to unfold hierarchical community structures of large networks based on modularity optimization, but this method cannot detect overlapping communities.
Game theories have been used to solve community detection problems. For example, Chen et al. (2010) addressed the community detection problem by a non-cooperative game theory-based framework (Nash 1951 ) that considers community formation as the result of individual agents' rational behaviours and a community structure as an equilibrium of a game. This framework can identify overlapping communities because each agent is allowed to select multiple communities, but hierarchies between communities cannot be revealed. Alvari et al. (2011) considered the formation of communities in social networks as an iterative game in a multiagent environment, in which each vertex is regarded as an agent aiming to be in the communities with members such that they are structurally equivalent. Lung et al. (2012) formulated the community detection problem from a game theory point of view and solved this problem by using a crowding based differential evolution algorithm adapted for detecting Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games. Hajibagheri et al. (2012) used a framework based on an information diffusion model and Shapley Value concept to address the community detection problem. In Hajibagheri et al.'s framework, each vertex of the underlying graph is attributed to a rational agent aiming to maximize its Shapley value in the form of information it receives, and the Nash equilibrium of the game corresponds to the community structure of the graph.
In our previous studies (Zhou et al. 2013a; 2013b) , we proposed two coalitional game models for community detection. But the coalitional game theories used in (Zhou et al. 2013a, ; 2013b) are canonical coalitional games due to the characteristic functions defined in the models satisfying superadditive (Saad et al. 2009 ).
In our previous studies (Zhou et al. 2013a; 2013b) , we proposed two coalitional game models for community detection. But both characteristic functions defined in these models satisfy superadditive, thus players are willing to form grand coalitions (the coalition of all players). In (Zhou et al. 2015a ), Based on those characteristic functions, players are willing to form grand coalitions (the coalition of all players). In Zhou et al. (2015a) , we combine cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to detect communities, while we propose a coalition formation game theory-based approach to detecting communities in multi-relational social networks, where multi-relational communities are defined as the shared communities over multiple single-relational graphs (Zhou et al. 2015b ).
Although the cooperative game is used in (Zhou et al. (2015a; , the forms of the utility function are different from the one designed in this paper.
A coalition formation game theory-based framework for community detection
One of the main characteristics that make a game a coalition formation game is the presence of a cost for forming coalitions. It makes coalition formation games generally not superadditive, which implies that forming a coalition brings gains to its members, but those gains are limited by a cost for forming the coalition, hence the grand coalition is seldom the optimal structure (Saad et al. 2009 ). In a coalition formation game, network structure and cost for cooperation play major roles.
In this paper, we propose a coalition formation game theory-based framework to identify overlapping and hierarchical communities, thus individuals of a network choose to form community structures after a social network is formed. Individuals in a social network are modelled as rational players aiming to achieve and improve utilities of groups by cooperating with other players to form coalitions. Coalitions with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as the merge operation can contribute to improve the utilities of the merged coalitions. The process of merging coalitions actually illustrates the process of forming the hierarchy communities. Meanwhile, each player is allowed to join multiple coalitions, which could capture and reflect the concept of "overlapping communities". A community structure of a network is a collection of coalitions, and the number of coalitions in a collection of coalitions is the number of communities with respect to the community structure. Due to the hierarchical form amongst communities, there are different community structures at different levels. Amongst them, a stable community structure is an equilibrium state of coalitions, in which no group of players has an interest in performing a merge operation any further.
The utility function for each coalition is defined as a combination (summation) of a gain function and a cost function. The gain function is based on a ratio of links inside a coalition over the total degree of vertices inside the same coalition, while the cost function is based on a ratio of the total degree of vertices inside a coalition over the total links in the network. The gain function measures the degree of the interaction amongst the players inside a coalition, while the cost function represents the degree of the interaction between the players of the coalition and the rest of the network. A coalition is regarded as a stable community if it cannot further improve its utility by merging with other coalitions.
For a given social network, the objective of detecting communities is to detect and identify the overlapping and hierarchical communities of the network. For this objective, we first present the notations, definitions and properties of the utility function. Also, a collection of coalitions, a coalition structure and a community structure can be used interchangeably.
Notations
Let ) , ( E V G  be
Definition 1. Stable community.
A coalition S is regarded as a stable community if S cannot further improve its utility by merging with other coalitions,
. Specially, S is called the grand coalition (Saad et al. 2009 ) if V S  , i.e., the coalition of all the players, while S is called a trivial coalition if S solely consists of a single vertex, i.e.
Definition 2. Utility increment of a coalition. The utility increment of coalition
A stable community structure is a form of equilibrium state of coalitions, in which no group of players has an interest in performing a merge operation any further.
When a game enters the equilibrium state, the number of coalitions in
is the number of communities, and the number of the vertices in k S is the size of the community k S .
, then the total utility ) (Γ v with respect to Γ is defined by the following equation (Equation 1): 
Utility function
Definition 5. Utility function. Let S be a coalition of
The first term and the second term in Equation (2) are called the gain function and the cost function of S , respectively. The gain function is the ratio of links inside S over the total degree of the vertices in S ; the cost function instead represents the ratio of the total degree in that coalition over the total degree in the network. The larger gain function value means that there are more interactions amongst the players inside S , and the larger cost function value means that there is greater interaction between the players of the coalition S and the rest of the network. Equation (1) means that forming a coalition brings gains to its members, but the gains are limited by a cost for forming the coalition.
 is a scale factor used to adjust the cost of coalition S ,
0   means no cost for forming coalitions, i.e. forming a coalition is always beneficial. In this case, the utility function ) (S v is superadditive due to it being defined only by the gain function. Thus,
That means that the utility function of the grand coalition has maximal value, while the utility function of a singleton coalition has a value of 0. When 1   , the costs for forming coalitions are maximal, Thus, 0 
. The 4-clique cannot be assessed correctly.
. So, the 4-clique can be assessed correctly.
In Figure 1( 
. The grand coalition has maximal utility, and two 3-cliques cannot be assessed correctly.
means that players 1, 2 and 3 do not collaborate with player 4 although player 4 intends to join the group 2,3} {1， . 
Properties of the utility function
The utility function ) (S v of coalition S defined in Equation (1) Therefore, all vertices are assumed to be of a degree greater than zero in this study,
i.e., isolated vertices are excluded from further consideration.
Property 2. The lower and upper bounds of ) (S v satisfy:
This property means that the utility of a clique is greater than the utility of each subset of the clique itself; the utility of a coalition composed of a clique and a vertex (that is not a member of the clique but is connected to a vertex of the clique) with degree 1 or 2 is greater than the utility of the clique, but the utility of the clique is greater than the utility of a coalition composed of the clique and a vertex (that is not a member of the clique but is connected to a vertex of the clique) with degree of at least 3.
Proof:
, because a 3-clique is a trivial clique), vertex
The relationships between x and y are shown in Figure   2 . For simplicity, let (Fortunato and Barthélemy 2006) .
(2) Because the utility function defined in Equation (1) Proof: Because S is a clique and 1
), therefore, y is just joined to S rather than changing the membership of the vertex of S .
For example, ({1,2,3,4}, {5,6}) is a stable community structure with respect to the vertices in Figure 4 (a), and ({1,2,3,4,7}, {5,6}) is a stable community structure after vertex 7 is connected to vertex 3 (shown in Figure 4 (c) ). This shows that ) (S v does not suffer from the non-locality. The sensitivity to satellites means that for a clique with leaves, a network of 2p
vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf vertices of 1 degree, such that each vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf vertex, the optimal community structure based on Newman and Girvan's modularity is composed of p groups, in which each group consists of a connected pair of a leaf and a clique vertex. Figure 5 (a)
shows an example (Brandes et al. 2008) .
Proof: According to Property 3, p-leaf vertices form the same coalition with vertices of the p-clique, i.e. the community formed by all vertices in the graph is a stable community.
Thus, the stable community structure corresponding to the network of Figure 5(a) is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} (shown in Figure 5 (b)). The scaling behaviour of Newman and Girvan's modularity means that by simply duplicating a network of 2p vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf vertices of 1 degree such that each vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf vertex, the optimal clustering is altered completely. For example, duplicating the network presented in Figure 5 (a), three clusters in Figure 5 (a) have been changed into two clusters, each of them being a network equivalent to the one in Figure 5 (a) (shown in Figure 6 ) (Brandes et al. 2008) .
Proof: According to Property 6, the community formed by all vertices in a network, of 2p vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf vertices of 1 degree such that each vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf vertex, is a stable community formed by all vertices; in the same way, the community formed by all vertices in the duplicated graph is also a stable community. Therefore, ) (S v does not have the scaling behaviour of Newman and Girvan's modularity.
For example, {1,2,3,4,5,6} is a stable community structure with respect to the vertices in Figure 5 (a), and {{1,2,3,4,5,6}, {1',2',3',4',5',6'}} is a stable community structure after the network presented in Figure 5 (a) is duplicated based on ) (S v (shown in Figure 6 ). From Figure 6 , we can see that the interactions amongst vertices in each coalition form a connected subgraph. 
A community detection algorithm
In this study, we develop a greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities, the main idea of the greedy agglomerative manner is to start from the vertices as separate coalitions (singletons); coalitions that can result the highest utility increment are iteratively merged into a larger coalition to improve the group's utilities until no such merge operation can be performed. In this section, we first present the conditions of merging two coalitions, and then we give our greedy agglomerative algorithm, referred to as the COFOGA (coalition formation game-based greedy agglomerative) algorithm.
The conditions of merging two coalitions
Let 1 S and 2 S be two small coalitions with few players. 1 S and 2 S can merge into a larger coalition if and only if the following conditions are held.
Condition 1:
. This condition means that the utilities of 1 S and 2 S have been improved through the merge operation.
The unilateral meet of two inequalities shows that two coalitions fail to reach an agreement to cooperate, for example, the case of " ) ( ) (
" suggests that 2 S intends to cooperate with 1 S but 1 S may not agree.
Note that there can be several pairs i and j such that ) (
. In these cases the algorithm selects an arbitrary pair to merge.
Condition 1 ensures that a coalition formed by the merge operation has greater utility than that of its subsets. 
Description of the coalition formation game-based greedy agglomerative algorithm
The pseudo-code for the greedy agglomerative algorithm is given in the COFOGA algorithm.
COFOGA algorithm:

Input: A network G(V, E)
Output: The communities of the network Steps: 
end for
Step 1~Step 
Experiments and results
In this section, extensive experiments have been undertaken for assessment:
(1) the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in real networks. Two well-known real networks are used to examine if the COFOGA algorithm can correctly identify the overlapping communities and the hierarchical structure of communities;
(2) the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in benchmark networks. These benchmark networks are produced under different assumptions containing different community information, such as different vertices, different connections, or different overlapping vertices. Because the real community information is known, we use the normalized mutual information (NMI) as the quantitative evaluation metric. These benchmark networks are also used to assess the efficiency of the COFOGA algorithm under different conditions.
(3) whether the COFOGA algorithm is limited by the resolution limit. To this end, we create two synthetic networks made of cliques (complete graphs). We want to find out whether the COFOGA algorithm can integrate the smaller cliques into the larger group.
(4) comparisons have been made with other algorithms in which non-cooperative game theory has been applied.
Assessing the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in real networks
We first apply the COFOGA algorithm in the Zachary's Karate Network (Zachary 1977) This experiment indicates that the COFOGA algorithm is able to discover overlapping and hierarchical communities, which by visual inspection provide meaningful information about the community structures and can be used in further investigation of community interconnections. We first produce a benchmark network with overlapping vertices by using Lancichinetti and Fortunato's method (2009) under following parameters: the number of vertices N =128, the average degree k=10, the maximum degree maxk=30, the mixing parameter, i.e. the portion of crossing edges mu=0.1, the minus exponent for the degree sequence t1=2, the minus exponent for the community size distribution t2=1, the minimum for the community sizes minc=10, the maximum for the community sizes maxc=30, the number of overlapping vertices on=10, the number of memberships of the overlapping vertices om=2. The benchmark structure and community structures detected by LocalEquilibrium and COFOGA are shown in Figure 10 and Table 1 . In Table 1 , the shaded vertices are overlapping vertices. Figure 10 , we can see that vertex 90 has also many links connected to different groups, so it is an overlapping vertex.
Next we produce a series of benchmark networks with overlapping vertices under different parameters and use the normalized mutual information (NMI) (Danon et al. 2005; ) between the detected community structure and the underlying ground truth as the evaluation metric ). The experimental results on the benchmark networks indicate that the COFOGA algorithm achieves results of high quality in terms of the NMI measures, and is much faster than the LocalEquilibrium algorithm.
Assessing the resolution limit
The first synthetic network (SNC1) is made of 30 identical cliques, which are complete graphs with five vertices connected by single links. The community structure of SNC1 detected by LocalEquilibrium is shown in Figure 14 
Conclusions
In this paper, community detection in a social network is modelled as a coalition formation game in which individuals cooperate with each other to improve a group's utilities. This matches well with the fact that a community in fact is an interactive phenomenon amongst multiple individuals, thus the proposed approach in this paper is able to detect communities more rationally, where overlapping and hierarchical communities can be identified. Because the number of coalitions is fewer than the number of individuals, the game amongst coalitions would require less computation than the game amongst all individuals, thus our approach, which is based on the coalition formation game, is more efficient than the approaches that are based on non-cooperative game theory. Meanwhile, our approach avoids the pre-requests for the number and the size of communities. In addition to discovering groups of related individuals in social networks, our approach can also be applied to other purposes, such as to detect sets of web pages dealing with the same topic, or biochemical pathways in metabolic networks.
In this study, we detect the community structure that maximizes the total utility by the coalition formation process in this paper, but we do not consider the evolution of this structure, i.e. the change of the community structure when one or more players joins or leaves the game.
In our utility function,  and  are two important parameters. In this study, community structures detected by the COFOGA are sensitive to  . As part of our future work, we consider the design of a method to find appropriate  and  automatically, or to design a more appropriate utility function.
In the future, we will further explore the properties of the coalition formation game, especially of the utility function, for tracing the evolution of the community structure and reducing the centralized complexity, and we will make efforts to reduce the computational complexity and investigate the distributed approach for forming coalitions, which has a distinct advantage for dealing with large scale networks.
